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ssl/statem: Replace size_t with int and add the checks

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Replace the type of variables with int to avoid implicit conversion when it is assigned by EVP_MD_get_size().
Moreover, add the checks to avoid integer overflow.

Fixes: 6594189 ("Merge early_data_info extension into early_data")
Fixes: 9368f86 ("Add TLSv1.3 client side external PSK support")
Fixes: 1053a6e ("Implement Server side of PSK extension parsing")
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@purdue.edu>

Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23937)
This commit is contained in:
Jiasheng Jiang 2024-03-22 16:00:39 +00:00 • committed by Tomas Mraz
parent 6d01857040
commit 48e3cf25a8
2 changed files with 18 additions and 4 deletions
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15
ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
View file

@ -979,8 +979,12 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
* Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
* length. * length.
*/ */
int md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
if (md_size <= 0)
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen
+ EVP_MD_get_size(md); + md_size;
} }
} }
@ -1019,7 +1023,8 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
{ {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
uint32_t agesec, agems = 0; uint32_t agesec, agems = 0;
size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen; size_t binderoffset, msglen;
int reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0;
unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL; unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL; const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
int dores = 0; int dores = 0;
@ -1115,6 +1120,8 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add; agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
reshashsize = EVP_MD_get_size(mdres); reshashsize = EVP_MD_get_size(mdres);
if (reshashsize <= 0)
goto dopsksess;
s->ext.tick_identity++; s->ext.tick_identity++;
dores = 1; dores = 1;
} }
@ -1144,6 +1151,10 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
} }
pskhashsize = EVP_MD_get_size(mdpsk); pskhashsize = EVP_MD_get_size(mdpsk);
if (pskhashsize <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
} }
/* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */ /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */

7
ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
View file

@ -1020,7 +1020,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx) X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{ {
PACKET identities, binders, binder; PACKET identities, binders, binder;
size_t binderoffset, hashsize; size_t binderoffset;
int hashsize;
SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL; SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
unsigned int id, i, ext = 0; unsigned int id, i, ext = 0;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL; const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
@ -1221,6 +1222,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
hashsize = EVP_MD_get_size(md); hashsize = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
if (hashsize <= 0)
goto err;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
@ -1234,7 +1237,7 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
} }
} }
if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize) { if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != (size_t)hashsize) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
goto err; goto err;
} }